西安电子科技大学学报 ›› 2016, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (3): 137-143.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-2400.2016.03.024

• 研究论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

信号博弈网络安全威胁评估方法

张恒巍;余定坤;韩继红;王晋东;寇广   

  1. (解放军信息工程大学 密码工程学院,河南 郑州  450001)
  • 收稿日期:2015-01-20 出版日期:2016-06-20 发布日期:2016-07-16
  • 通讯作者: 张恒巍
  • 作者简介:张恒巍(1978-),男,解放军信息工程大学博士研究生,E-mail: zhw11qd@126.com.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(61303074; 61309013);国家重点基础研究发展计划(“973”计划)资助项目(2012CB315900)

Network security threat assessment based on the signaling game

ZHANG Hengwei;YU Dingkun;HAN Jihong;WANG Jindong;KOU Guang   

  1. (Institute of Cipher Engineering, PLA Information Engineering Univ., Zhengzhou  450001, China)
  • Received:2015-01-20 Online:2016-06-20 Published:2016-07-16
  • Contact: ZHANG Hengwei

摘要:

目前,基于博弈理论的网络安全防御多数使用完全信息或静态博弈理论来进行攻防博弈模型的建立.为了更加贴近网络实际进行安全威胁评估,提出了基于信号博弈的网络攻防博弈模型,从动态、不完全信息角度对攻防行为建模;给出了信号博弈完美贝叶斯均衡求解过程,并对存在的各类均衡进行分析;将后验信念作为防御者对攻击者类型的预测,提出基于上述模型的网络安全威胁评估算法,对防御者面临的安全威胁进行评估,给出相应安全威胁等级.最后,通过对一个网络实例进行分析,验证了提出模型和方法的可行性和有效性.

关键词: 信号博弈, 动态, 不完全信息, 威胁评估, 完美贝叶斯均衡

Abstract:

Nowadays, researches on network security defense based on game theory mostly use completed information or static game theory to establish the attack-defense model. In order to perform security threat assessment in a closer way to the practical situation in a network, this paper proposes a network attack-defense game model based on the signaling game, which is modeled in a dynamic and uncompleted way. After putting forward the solving process of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game, this paper analyzes all kinds of equilibriums existing in the game. Taking the posterior belief as the defender's prediction of the attacker's type, this paper puts forward the assessment algorithm for the network security threat based on the model above, predicts the security threat the defender is facing, and provides the security threat grade for the evaluator. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the model and the method proposed by this paper are testified through the analysis of a network example.

Key words: signaling game, dynamic, uncompleted information, threat assessment, perfect Bayesian equilibrium

中图分类号: 

  • TP309
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